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Abstrac In recent years, the electric utility industries world 
wide have been undergoing deregulation to introduce 
competitiveness in the generation, transmission, and distribution of 
electric power. The once centralised system planning and operation 
management must be remodelled to adapt to the new market 
structure. In particular, the trading mechanism needs to be totally 
revised as any party may now get involved in this free-market, 
subject to the unavoidable constraints such as generation volumes, 
physical transmission means, and days-ahead scheduling. This 
paper presents a multi-agent model in conjunction with game 
theory to resolve the coalition formation for multilateral trades [I]. 
We have implemented the model using the Java programming 
language and the JATLite/JAT0.3 agent development tools 
developed by Stanford University. 
Keywords: Game theory, multi-agent system, coalition formation, 
multilateral trades; 
I INTRODUCTION 
In the past, the production and distribution of electric 
power was viewed as natural monopoly due to the enormous 
economic scale involved in the construction of such power 
plants and transmission systems. The franchised monopoly, 
insulated from competition, obviously has a much weaker 
incentive to control cost and avoid poor decisions than would 
be in an open market. As such, customers are imposed 
excessive costs that are economically unjustifiable. 
Instead of pricing the generation, transmission, and 
distribution services as a bundled commodity, now these 
services can be offered as individual service providers. As a 
consequence, a far greater number of participants, with many 
of them previously excluded, may involve in the trading 
competition to assure a cost effective, market-driven electric 
facility to end users. 
PE-432-FWRS-0-07-1998 A paper recommended and approved by 
the IEEE Power System Analysis, Computing and Economics 
Committee of the IEEE Power Engineering Society for publication in the 
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems. Manuscript submitted August 
26, 1997; made available for printing June 22, 1998. 
Following this, Wu and Varaiya [l, .-we proposed a new 
paradigm in which the decision mechanisms regarding the 
economics and reliability of system operation are separated. 
In their model, the economic decision should be carried out 
through private multilateral trades among generators and 
consumers whereas system security and reliability is better 
left to an independent system operator [2]. They have also 
proved that multilateral contract involving three or more 
parties are necessary for efficient market operation. 
Based on that result, we attempt to model the trading 
process using multi-agent theory. Such a model addresses the 
problem of how market participants negotiate for multilateral 
contracts that are mutually beneficial without a central 
coordinating figure. Each agent imitates the behaviour of an 
electricity market participant which can be a generator, a 
customer, a transmission owner or any interested party. 
In the next section, we will first outline a method for 
coalition formation in the form of agent cooperation and 
coordination. Since each agent is autonomous and rational by 
definition, it provides its own criteria to determine which 
agent to be partnered has a better payoff. In Section 111, we 
will introduce the cooperative standard of fairness (C-SOF) 
and the Shapley value [3] often used in game theory to 
derive and specify these criteria. In Section IV, we will 
present the agent models with increasing complexity in 
handling and dividing transmission network cost. Finally, the 
computation for payoffs among agents at the end of coalition 
formation is given. 
We have developed a multi-agent system for our model 
using Java and the JATLite/JAT0.3 agent tools from 
Stanford in order to achieve platform independence and 
internet accessibility. 
I1 COALITION FORMATION 
The coalition formation is a process of forming a 
profitable partnership for a group of participants. Our 
method is based on Ketchpel [3] with modification to the 
new power market environment. Klush and Shehory also 
modified Ketchpel’s algorithm for the cooperative 
recognition process within the Federative Cell System for 
discovery of Inter-database dependencies (FCSI) [4]. Our 
algorithm comprises of four phases instead of three in 
Ketchpel’s. These four phases are described in order as 
followed. 
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A. Local information derivation phase 
Each agent first derives its local information, for example, 
the cost of generation or benefit of consumption of electric 
power, and then determines the profit when acting alone. 
This profit is called the agent’s self-value. The self-value 
would then be the minimum profit that the agent could 
achieve without cooperating with others. The derivation of 
such local information depends on the agent’s environment 
and will be discussed in Section IV. 
B. Communication phase 
Communication among agents allows them to locate other 
agents that may have beneficial trades if they collaborate. 
During this phase, each agent exchanges its local information 
derived earlier including the self-value with other agents 
either directly or indirectly through a coordinator. It also 
gathers information from an independent system operation 
agerct concerning the surrounding environment, if any. The 
information exchanged between agents should be sufficient 
to calculate the joint payoffs. 
C. Local calculation phase 
Once each agent has the requested information from all 
other agents in the environment, the local calculation phase 
begins. Here, each agent calculates the share of benefit if 
teaming with another agent and creates a preference ordering 
with respect to the shares. The field of game theory offers 
several alternatives for criteria that may be useful to divide 
the group utility. In this paper, we adopt the cooperative 
standard of fairness (C-SOF) and the Shapley value to be 
discussed in Section 111. 
D. Bilateral negotiation phase 
In this phase, each agent maintains a preference list of 
those agents with which it can collaborate beneficially. The 
agents then extend offers to each other according to their 
preference lists, accept offers that may improve their 
positions, and decline others. The newly formed coalition 
will behave like one decision-making unit, i.e. a new-born 
agent, from then on. 
Notice that the four phases will be iterated in order until 
no more coalition is possible or a pre-determined time limit 
has reached. 
I11 NEGOTIATION PREFERENCE LIST 
We now discuss the two approaches in establishing the 
negotiation preference list in the third phase of the coalition 
formation process. 
Common extra Davoff 
Tlie first approach is to use the common extra payoff as a 
criterion. The common extra payoff of a new coalition is the 
difference between the payoff of the new coalition and the 
sum of the payoff of its founder agents, that is, the excess 
payoff. In using this criterion, we have made the assumption 
that the founder agents in the new coalition have an equal 
share of the excess and this is exactly the idea of cooperative 
standard of fairness (C-SOF). The C-SOF assigns each 
negotiation group with a fair share that consists of the 
superadditive cover of its value plus an equal share of the 
excess of the maximum joint gain minus the sum of each 
negotiation group’s maximum joint gain [8]. The 
superadditive cover refers to the maximum obtainable joint 
profit of a coalition in cooperative game theory. 
Another similar and intuitive criterion is the relative 
weighting. Unlike the equal share of excess payoff among 
agents in C-SOF, a stronger agent should have a larger share 
of the excess. In this context, agent A is stronger than agent 
B if and only if the payoff of agent A when acting alone is 
greater than that of agent B. 
Bilateral Shadev Value 
The second approach is introduced by Ketchpel in his 
proposed algorithm, the so-called Bilateral Shapley Value 
(BSV). It avoids the exponential complexity of Shapley 
value calculation. The Shapley value is calculated by looking 
at each of the different dynamics that could lead to the 
coalition under consideration. 
We assumed that agents form a coalition either by being 
the founder or by joining one at a time with a coalition that 
already exists. Hence the set of formation dynamics is simply 
the permutations of the agents in the coalition. Each agent 
adds value to a given formation process of the coalition 
based on the marginal utility gain created by that agent. By 
averaging an agent’s marginal contribution across all the 
different formation possibilities, its Shapley value is 
obtained. This calculation ensures that the sum of the 
Shapley values for all of the members of the coalition will be 
exactly the coalition’s combined value. The calculation of 
Shapley value requires looking at all of the permutations and 
this is an exponential operation. But the computation of 
Shapley values for coalition of two agents is relatively small 
and the values are termed the Bilateral Shapley Values. 
Consider a game with a set of N players and characteristic 
function v,  for a potential coalition of two players, A and B, 
the BSV of player A is given by: 
% v(A) + % (v(AB)-v(B)) 
and correspondingly, the BSV of B is: 
% v(B) + ‘h (v(AB)-v(A)) 
Indeed, in a coalition of two agents, the values based on C- 
SOF and those on bilateral Shapley value are the same. So in 
this paper, we use the values based on these two different 
approaches interchangeably. 
IV AGENT MODELLING 
Based on the above coalition formation scheme with the 
game theoretical approach in establishing the negotiation 
preference list, we can introduce the agent modelling 
techniques to simulate the dialogues and negotiation among 
market participants. 
The first model is rudimentary in which the transmission 
network cost is ignored. In the second model, this cost will 
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Fig. 1 A 4-bus system 
In the figure, bus nodes 0 and 0 represent generators 
whereas bus nodes 0 and @ represent customer loads. The 
number in bracket for each transmission line refers to the 
reactance per power unit, for example, line number 3 has a 
reactance of 0.25. 
A. Agent model without transmission network cost 
An agent is a dispatchable process which behaves 
autonomously, rationally, cooperatively, and with high 
mobility. A multi-agent system specifies the coordination 
and the communication medium for agents of an application. 
In our multi-agent system, an agent is naturally a 
generator, a customer load, or an aggregate of both. For 
simplicity, we do not consider fractional bus generators and 
loads. We also assume that any set of generation units and 
customer loads attached to the same bus belong to a single 
agent. So for the 4-bus system, we have a maximum of four 
agents, corresponding to the two generator buses and the two 
customer load buses. 
We formulate the computation of joint payoff for a 
potential coalition C as an optimization problem and find the 
power injection p c  by the entities in C, resulting in optimal 
joint profit which indeed is the value of coalition C. 
I+/+ 
909 p2= 90.9091 
p2= 58.8237 
p2= 58.8237 
ID, = -62.4997 ID, = -51.6333 
= -62.4997 = -67.4394 
p, = -44.6456 
= -60.5682 
p2=  71.1205 
p3 = -74.1 161 
I:= 90.9091 
ps = -90.9091 
= -90.9091 
Table 1. Two coalition formation cases - no transmission cost 
It should be noted that the profit for the grand coalition 
{O,Q,O,@} is indeed the global optimal. 
A.1. Case 1 - same generation and same consumption costs 
In case 1, since the cost of generation is the same for both 
generators (and the benefit of consumption is the same for 
both consumers), there is no difference for the generators to 
trade with any of the customers. However, the actual path of 
power flow may be different. For example, the joint profits 
for the coalitions {O,O} and {O,@} are the same but the 
paths for the line flow are different as illustrated in Figure 2. 
In the figure, the outer loop represents the line flow for the 
coalition {O,O} and the inner loop for that of {O,@}. 
The mathematical formulation is: 
Minimize U T  .C(PC) 
subject to U T  ' p c  = o  
Profit of coalition C, 
where C = vector of cost I benefit functions for agents in C 
pc= vector of power injections by agents in C 
U = unit vector, i.e.. column vector of all ones 
V(C)  = -uT . c(pC(,,,,",) 
Ill2068361 I 
In addition, we assume that the cost of generation and the 
benefit of consumption, c(q), vary quadratically in terms of 
the power injection q, that is: 
c(q) = aq + bq2 
We now present two cases. In the first case, the costs of 
generation for 0 and Q are the same, and so are the benefits 
of consumption for 0 and @. In the second case, they are all 
different. The local information and the profit of all possible 
coalitions for both cases are shown in Table 1. 
Fig. 2 Line flow for coalitions (0,  @} and (0, @} - A . I .  
However, if the transmission cost is included, the profit for 
the above two coalitions will no longer be the same. 
932 
Another coalition set { {O,@},{Q,@}} has the same total 
profit as the grand coalition. Again, if transmission cost is 
included, there will be a significant difference in the total 
profit as illustrated in Figure 3 and Figure 4. 
outer loop for {Q,B} 
inner loop for {O,@} 
Fig. 3 Line flow for coalitions [ O , @ }  and {Q,@} - A . I .  
In Figure 4, there is no power flowing along line 1 and 4 
in the grand coalition. For non-negative transmission costs, 
the grand coalition will always have the least cost. 
1 1 -  I t  
Fig. 4 Line flow for the grand coalition - A.1  
A.2.  Case 2 - diflerent generation and diflerent consumption 
In case 2, the costs of generation are different and the 
benefits of consumption are also different. According to 
Table: 1 and the game theory based method in Section 111, a 
preference list for each agent needs to be formed. The order 
of forming coalitions and the distribution of payoff among 
agenis are: 
I" round 
The shared profit for {O,@} in {O,Q,@,@} is the same 
as when they are standalone. The same happens to {Q,O}. 
So the final coalition set is {{O,@},{Q,@}}. The idea 
behind is simply the least cost matching with the highest 
benefit and the process continues. 
B. Agent model with linear transmission network cost 
In this model, the set of autonomous agents and the 
assumptions are pretty much the same as before, with one 
exception: that the cost of using a transmission line varies 
linearly with its line flow (Figure 5 )  and the transmission 
network has infinite capacity. 
t 
1, 
cost of using 
the 
transmission 
line 
141 
magnitude of line flow 
Fig. 5 Line cost versus line flow in model 2 
With the transmission cost iil mind, we have a new 
formulation for the optimization problem. 
The mathematical formulation is: 
Minimize U T  . C ( p c )  +I' . IH .PI 
V(C> = - u T  . ~ ( p ~ ( r n n , ) - ~ ~  * I H  .P(rnin,l 
subject to d . p c  = o  
Profit of coalition C, 
where C = vector of cost I benefit functions for agents in C 
pc  = vector of power injections by agents in C 
I 
H = transfer admittance matrix of the transmission 
= vector of all transmission line costs 
network 
p = vector of all net power injections at all buses 
U =column vector of all ones 
by the agents in C 
We will also consider two cases here. In the first case, the 
transmission costs of all lines are the same as they have the 
same slope m. In the second case, the cost of line 2 increases 
sharply while keeping the rest unchanged. The global and 
local information, and the joint profit of all possible 
coalitions for both cases, are shown below (Table 2). Notice 
that the generation costs and the consumption costs are 
identical respectively. 
Coalitions formed after Ist round are {O,@} and {Q,@}. 
The shaded is the One to be 
chosen to form coalition after each round of negotiation 
process. 
agent in the 
2"d round 
Preference list 
O,@ 582 
Global information Local information 
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Fig. 6 Line flow for coalitions {O,O) and lo,@} - R I .  
When the coalitions {O,@} and {0,0) cooperate, the 
line flows along line 1 (and line 4) are counter-balanced as 
illustrated in Figure 4 and Figure 7. So the cost will certainly 
be less than that when {O,@} and {0,0) work separately. 
I II Ip4=-68.1821 I I I p4 = -47.2193 I 
Table 2. Two coalition formation cases - linear transmission cost 
B. 1. Case 1 - same transmission line cost 
The coalition formation process is illustrated below: 
1 " round 
In case 1, the transmission costs for all lines are the same. 
Preference list I Agent 11 Potential 1 BSV 11 Potential I BSV I 
The coalitions formed after the 1" round are {O,@} and 
{Q,O). The payoff configuration (PC) is thus (184, 184, 
184, 184; {O,@}, ( 0 , O ) ) .  
2"d round 
Preference list 1 g2 i m 1  
511.5 
O,@ 51 1.5 
After the 2"d round, the grand coalition is formed and the 
corresponding PC is (255.75, 255.75, 255.75, 255.75; 
Now, we investigate the line flow for the coalition ( 0 , O )  
and {O,@} as depicted in Figure 6 and compare it with the 
Figure 3 earlier. For coalition {O,@},  a larger amount of 
power is flowing along line 2, which connects bus 0 and bus 
@. For coalition {O,O), there is no direct path from bus 0 
to bus 0. So it is sensible that coalition (O,@} has a higher 
profit than coalition { 0, 0).  
{O,Q,@,@)). 
Fig. 7 Line flow for { { O , @ ) ,  (0 ,O} ]  - B . I  
In Figure 8, there is no power flowing along line 1 and 4 
in the grand coalition so its transmission cost is the least. 
Fig. 8 Line flow for the grand coalition - B . I .  
B.2. Case 2 - diferent transmission line cost 
the coalition formation process is as follows: 
1 " round 
In case 2 where the transmission line costs are different, 
Preference list I Agent 11 Potential I BSV 11 Potential I BSV I 
Agent (0 )  extends offer to (0)  and at the same time, 
(0) extends offer to (0). Since in the preference list of 
{ O), { 0 )  is at a higher position than { O), so { 0 )  accepts 
the offer from (0 )  and declines that from (0 ) .  Being 
rejected by {O}, (0 )  extends offer to (4) which is next to 
{O} in its preference. {a} accepts the offer from (0) .  So 
934 
1 :g 1 
coalitions formed after the 1” round are { 0,  0) and {O,@}. 
The: PC is (48.5, 135, 135,48.5; {Q,0}, {O,@}). 
-- 2”d round 
Preference list Potentiaiailayers BSV 
189 
{O ,@]  362 
I II,,,,,l I 
Fig. 9 Line flow for coalitions {O,@} and {O ,@}  - B.2. 
V PROFIT ALLOCATION 
So far, we only consider the formation of coalition 
strhctures dynamically. We have not discussed the allocation 
of l~ayoffs among the agents. Once the coalition structure is 
known, there are many solution concepts to derive the payoff 
vectors, for example, the core, stable set and Shapley value 
from game theory. But in order to be consistent with the 
evolution of the coalition structure, the allocation method 
should be consistent with the criterion in establishing the 
negotiation preference list. Otherwise, the coalition structure 
so formed will not be stable. For example, if we base on a 
“fair” partition of the excess payoff in establishing the 
preference list, then in profit allocation, we should also 
follow the same partition approach. 
Now consider a game of 4 agents named A,  B,  C and D. 
We assume that the criterion in establishing the negotiation 
preference list is based on the cooperative standard of 
fairness (C-SOF). Then the coalition formation stages are: 
According to proposed allocation method, the profit for 
{A,B}  in {A,B,C,D} will be its value plus an equal share of 
the difference between the joint profit, and the sum of its 
value and its partner’s value, PAB say. That is 
{ (4 9 {B) ,  {C) 3 {D) 1 + { {A,B) 3 {C,D) I + {A,B,C,W. 
1 
2 
1 
2 
PAB = V(  AB) + - (v( ABCD) - V (  A B )  - V(  CD)) 
Similarly, 
PCD =: v(CD)  +-(V(ABCD) - V ( A B )  - V(CD)) 
The profit for A, PA will be 
1 
2 PA = V(  A )  + - (pAB - V (  A )  - V(B)) 
and the profit for all the other agents are calculated similarly. 
VI1 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we have introduced a new idea in developing 
multilateral trades using game theory and multi-agent 
modelling. The objective is to derive a workable and 
profitable coalition partnership under the fair play practice. 
The agent models discussed in this paper are relatively 
simple to the extent that bilateral trade seems suffice. 
However, the variation in transmission line costs, inclusion 
of counter-flow within a coalition, and release of 
transmission constraints by having more parties involved in a 
trade contributes to the preference of multilateral trade. We 
are in the process of defining more models with higher order 
of complexity such as including the transmission network 
constraints to secure power generation and transmission 
conditions. To the far end, we attempt to model the 
transmission network owners as agents instead of acting 
purely as service providers. 
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